2 Cime is the spelling customarily used by members of this family and by others in Yucatan rather than the Ceme employed in previous publications.
3 Many thanks are due Asael T. Hansen for information on the location of these migrants. In order to minimize identification as members of the subordinate caste of Mayas (in Yucatan usually called mestizos), many villagers who come to have more contact with urban persons change their Maya family names to Spanish names similar in sound or meaning. Thus, many of the Pats now call themselves Padilla, the Tamays are now Tamayo, one Cime family with a home in Merida is now Castilla, Camaal becomes Camara, and Ek (meaning "star") becomes Estrella.
It is noteworthy that the Tamays and Pats have long been related to the Cimes. The mother of the oldest living generation of Tamays was a sister of Don Eus's father. Don Eus's first and main wife was a sister of the oldest living generation of Pats.
CLASS CONFLICT AND CACIQUE IN CHAN KOM THE MAIN ISSUES
This paper is directed to three main issues in connection with Redfield's account of the social life and history of Chan Kom. One concerns the reasons why Chan Kom "chose progress" specifically regarding the decision to raise the politico-legal status of the community, first from rancherid to pueblo and then from pueblo to capital of an independent municipality. The previous analysis (Goldkind 1965 :881) explained the first achievement in terms of the following generalization: "Important decisions influencing the general life of the community were determined by, and decided in the interests of, the minority of families in the top ranks of the economic, status, and political dimensions of the social stratification system of the community." Additional information was obtained which gives further support to the relevance of this interpretation for explaining Chan Kom's rise in status from pueblo to capital of a municipality.
A second issue is the alleged general acceptance of the development of private holdings in the communal ejido lands of Chan Kom. Redfield (1950: 55-61) noted a shift in economic emphasis from the cultivation of corn on the decreasingly productive soils to the increasingly profitable herding of hogs and cattle and the buying and selling of corn, hogs, and cattle. He reported a decline in corn productivity between one-third and one-half in the seventeen years between his two studies, a period during which the village population increased from about 250 to 445 (Redfield 1950:68, 171) . During this period "the increase of wealth has no doubt increased the difference in wealth between the richest man of Chan Kom and the poorest man" in part because some of the wealthier men were accumulating relatively large private holdings both outside the Chan Kom ejido and in the form of de facto private control of legally communally owned lands within the ejido. Although at first these men "were opposed by some in the village," according to Redfield (1950:60) : "Now the people approve of the recognition of individual rights in the ejidos." Doubt had been at least implied in my earlier analysis that all classes of the population really would have given such approval under these circumstances, and this was a matter on which I was especially concerned to obtain information.
The third issue concerns the substantial migration from Chan Kom which began shortly after Redfield's second study. Redfield had characterized the social life of Chan Kom in 1948 as relatively free from factionalism and as otherwise so satisfying to its residents as to make migration seem highly unlikely:
By 1948 the divisive effect upon the village of the Protestant movement had been largely overcome. At least it is true that by that time the people as a whole again moved forward on the paths of action set out for them by a leadership consistent within itself (Redfield 1950:110) .
The impulse to emigrate, the spirit of pioneering, was spent in the settlement and the building of Chan Kom. The people are content in success; they are not restless. The many children are fed with the labor on the land and with the commerce that has now been added; there are no surplus sons that have to emigrate (Redfield 1950:151 Thus, the main interest of this paper is in the reasons for Chan Kom's rise in politico-legal status from pueblo to capital of a new municipality, the alleged general acceptance of the innovation of a few relatively large private holdings in the village ejido communal lands at a time of increasing population and declining productivity, and the large migration since 1948. These phenomena are so inter-related that the choice of a beginning is almost arbitrary. Let us begin with the ejido.
CLASS CONFLICT AND CACIQUE IN CHAN KOM CLASS CONFLICT IN ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES
Redfield (1950:57-60 ) explained the innovation of private ejido holdings in terms of the greater individual initiative of the "four or five" wealthy men who were developing them. He did not mention that all of these men were members of the same patrilineal family group, the Cimes. Don Eustaquio Cime told me that he had obtained authorization from the administration of Avila Camacho (President of Mexico, 1941-1946) for himself and each of his sons to take permanent private possession for himself-and pass on to his heirs-up to twenty-four hectares of land in the Chan Kom ejido. Officials of the appropriate governmental agencies in Merida and Valladolid found it impossible to believe the granting of legal authorization for such differential privileges in this type of ejido in Yucatan.6
In approaching this subject with the Tamays and others who had migrated with them to Tizimin, I was especially careful to question them in as neutral a manner as possible so as not to influence their responses. However, once rapport had been established, the mere mention of this matter consistently evoked immediate and emphatic disapproval of the development of private holdings in the ejido lands of Chan Kom. One typical expression of resentment was: "The richest of Chan Kom, the cattle owners, took over the best ejido lands. If a few take over the best parts of the ejido, then the poor can't cultivate."
The Tamays were not among the poorest of Chan Kom, but in conversing with me they used the term pobre interchangeably with milpero-one who makes milpa. They regarded the population of Chan Kom as divided between the poor, who like themselves lived primarily from corn cultivation, and the rich, who had many cattle and engaged in the buying and selling of grain, hogs, and cattle on a relatively large scale. (This terminology, also used by other informants including Don Eus, contrasts with Redfield's contention that "there is no group of the known and self-known poor," Redfield 1950:61 .) The cultivation of corn, of course, is a practice much more traditional and functionally related to various aspects of Maya culture than is the herding of hogs or cattle.
Informants reported that they learned of the new development in a general assembly when Don Eus simply announced that certain areas of the ejido no longer would be generally available to ejido members. These areas included all of the few ejido water sources (except for those in the village itself) and the best land with the highest growth. Henceforth, these lands were to be treated as though they were the private holdings of Don Eus and several other Cimes.
In addition to seizing control of the best ejido lands for themselves, the Cimes prevented other members of the Chan Kom ejido from cultivating as much of the remainder of the ejido as they wished. This was accomplished through control of the office of comisario of the ejido.6
In the village ejidos of Yucatan where shifting cultivation is practiced, each member must obtain prior approval from the ejido comisario as to the size and location of any milpa on ejido lands. Every year many men must select a new milpa site. In order to decide between two or more wishing to cultivate the same land, and to assure equity in the amount and quality of land available to all members of the ejido, the comisario has considerable authority to adjudicate disputes and restrict the size of milpas. A different person is supposed to be elected to the office of ejido comisario by the total membership (males aged 16 to 69) every three years, along with a Consejo de Vigilancia to insure the proper conduct of ejido affairs.
However, in Chan Kom since at least the early 1940's, except for one brief notable exception discussed later, the official ejido positions have been occupied by the Cimes and their close allies. For four successive three-year terms prior to 1958 the ejido comisario was the same individual, a half-brother of Don Eus. Many found themselves given permission to cultivate only two or three hectares of poor land, barely enough to support a household, while several Cimes were cultivating up to ten times this area of much better land. In the bitter words of one informant: "The comisario assigned the best lands to his relatives and left rock for the poor to cultivate." Redfield (1950:60) noted that the increase of cattle in Chan Kom had increased the frequency of cattle invading milpas and consuming the corn, a problem still very much present. Both state law and local custom required the owner of the cattle to recompense the owner of the milpa for damage to his corn. The migrants primarily dedicated to making milpa still showed their indignation when they recalled the refusal of the Cimes to pay for such damage. The Cimes had by far the most cattle and reportedly would turn them loose to wander in areas of the bush remote from their own milpas at the beginning of the dry season when the corn was ripe for harvesting. The Cimes placed all responsibility for damage to corn on the milpa owners for not constructing sufficiently strong fencing around their milpas. The corn cultivators argued that it was the responsibility of the herders to provide adequate fencing and control of their cattle.
Thus, many of the Chan Kom families of lower status found themselves deprived of access to the best ejido land, restricted to the cultivation of relatively small areas of the worst ejido land, and not compensated for damage to milpas by cattle of the wealthiest cattle herders. These were important economic reasons for the migrations from Chan Kom, but certain political developments also came to play their part in making conditions increasingly intolerable, especially for those of lesser status who could least effectively defend their interests. The relatively wealthy were able to take measures to secure and even increase their economic advantages and political dominance because they occupied or controlled the official positions not only in the ejido organization but also in the government of Chan Kom. However, only after Chan Kom became the capital of an independent municipality could this control by a few become as complete as eventually developed.
DIFFERENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICAL PROGRESS FROM PUEBLO TO MUNICIPIO
Redfield ( It is far more difficult to obtain the intervention of higher authority in appealing the decisions of municipal officials. In order even to make a complaint the villager in this region must go to the town of Valladolid or the city of Merida. The geographic distance is much greater but the sociocultural distance is even more serious an obstacle. In these urban centers the Maya villager must appeal to persons who regard the Maya as an inferior caste and therefore treat them with even more than the usual officious arrogance of urban officials dealing with low status rural people. The cultural gap is too great for the low status villagers who are most likely to need the protection of higher authorities but who are also usually the most uncomfortable and inept in speaking "correct" Spanish with educated urban persons.
The legal right of an independent municipality to control its own affairs with little outside interference must have seemed attractive to all the leading families of Chan Kom. Furthermore, although no official of a mere pueblo receives a salary, several municipal officials receive substantial salaries from higher governmental levels. These positions are filled locally and have been customarily rotated among members of the high status Chan Kom families.
I was told that while the leading families were working together to obtain higher political status for Chan Kom, their personal relations were usually quite amicable. Afterwards this changed as the largest and wealthiest of the leading family groupings, the Cimes, began to take steps to increase their economic and political advantage. The Cimes were led by Don Epifanio Cime (Don Fano), long the wealthiest man in Chan Kom, and, especially after Don Fano reached advanced age in the 1940's, by Don Eus. At first the Cimes received cooperation, or at least passive acceptance, from the other leading families while taking measures which usually resulted mainly in advantages for the Cimes at the expense particularly of the lower status families, e.g., the taking of permanent private possession of ejido lands discussed earlier. However, when these other prominent families came to realize the extent of the threat to their own interests, overt conflict with the Cimes occurred.
Some informants were willing to express themselves more freely than others, but, except for members of the Cime family, there was essentially complete 7 Don Fano had raised Don Eus in his own household after the death of the latter's father, Don Diego, who was Don Fano's brother. Don Diego was the founder whose personal saint had been adopted as Chan Kom's patron saint, the latter still considered to belong to the Cime family (cf. Goldkind 1965:875-876, 883) . 332 agreement among all informants about the role of Don Eus in the events reported here. A number of informants, both rural and urban, referred to Don Eus as a cacique. This term has the connotation of tyrant when applied to leaders in urban and peasant communities by Mexicans sympathetic to the ideals of the Revolution of 1910. A cacique is understood to have the economic and political power to dominate his local community, although this power may be shared among several caciques. Typically, the cacique engages in illegal dealing with allies of similar ethics and profits from corruption in the public offices which he occupies or controls. A substantial share of all public funds collected or distributed in the community is apt to be taken for his private use. The cacique often is completely ruthless in his treatment of all who oppose him in any undertaking, and in his exploitation of the economically poor and the politically weak. The cacique achieves and maintains his position through political intrigue, alliances, and bribery within the local community, with politicians in larger urban centers, and through the use or threat of armed violence. The cacique uses political power to obtain economic wealth and vice versa, and the greater his success the higher his prestige.
Once rapport was established with all informants but the Cimes, every suggestion from me that Don Eus had worked for the improvement of Chan Kom invariably evoked emphatic denials that he supported projects because of any genuine concern for the general welfare. Various accounts were given of Although during the 1950's the Tamays and Pats were losing prestige and power to the Cimes within the upper stratum of high status families, the most serious difficulties were being experienced by the lower status and politically weak families mainly preoccupied with attempting to secure subsistence from the cultivation of corn in the worsening ecological situation. Members of these families eventually mobilized political support behind two men of high status whom they considered sympathetic to their interests and helped them to obtain high office. This was how a Tamay became president of the municipality in 1947 and a Pat became comisario of the ejido in 1958. Both of these men had held these offices earlier, when cooperation still prevailed among the high status families, and they had not seriously opposed Cime interests. However, in these later terms of office their attempts to act in favor of the interests of the majority of corn cultivators became a threat to Cime economic and political dominance as well as prestige. The resulting conflicts led to the largest migrations from Chan Kom and the consolidation of power by the Cimes led by Don Eus. 
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Whether because of a genuine concern for the plight of the corn cultivators or a concern that officials of the state banking system which has some supervisory control over the ejido might take action, a remedy opposed to Cime interests was proposed by the comisario, even though he was a half-brother of Don Eus. This proposal, which has been realized in some ejidos in Yucatan, was that one large section of the Chan Kom ejido should be fenced off as a common pasture to be used for the cattle of all ejido members. Since such a pasture would require a water source, it would have to include land already seized by the Cimes for their exclusive private use.
In the midst of the ensuing controversy, the term of office of the ejido comisario was nearing its end, and it became necessary to assemble the membership for the election of a new comisario. Although Don Eus actively sought the post for one of his sons, the out-going comisario nominated one sympathetic to the proposal for ejido reform: Don Primitivo Pat, the same "young Pat" leader whose preaching had made him the favorite of the Protestant missionaries some twenty-five years previously (Redfield 1950 :94-109). Don Primitivo was elected with the strong support of those primarily dedicated to corn cultivation. Don Eus stalked furiously out of the meeting, calling his half-brother a "traitor." The latter soon found it prudent to migrate from Chan Kom.
When Don Eus realized that the new comisario was conferring frequently with the lower status corn cultivators in favor of the plan for a common ejido pasture, he went to speak with the new comisario's father, Don Eluterio Pat (Don Elut), the patriarch of the Pats remaining resident in Chan Kom. Don Elut reported that Don Eus addressed him as follows: "Don't be foolish. Do the same as I'm doing. Put a fence around some of the ejido land for yourself. These others are poor people and newcomers to Chan Kom-they can't win against us. Don't pay attention to what they say. It cost us a great deal to make this pueblo and convert it to an independent municipality. Why shouldn't we enjoy the benefits of these lands?" However, the ejido land which he suggested that the Pats might take was relatively poor land with no source of water, and this hardly seemed to the Pats like a generous offer. (One Pat informant suggested that this offer should have been accepted to avoid the conflict which followed because "the Cimes and Pats were the only ones who were important.") Despite many discussions and meetings, at least one of which ended in mass fisticuffs, the Cimes still refused to withdraw control from any of the ejido land they had seized. One night a group of men-led by Don Primitivo, according to the Cimes-with the reluctant consent of Primitivo, according to the Pats-destroyed the fencing around sections of the ejido taken by Don Eus and 338 CLASS CONFLICT AND CACIQUE IN CHAN KOM Don Fano. The latter told me that some cattle also were killed, although this was denied by the Pats. The Cimes went to the appropriate oflicials in Merida and accused the Pats of having destroyed their property. A number of policemen were sent to arrest the Pat men and took them to Merida where they were made to spend time in jail, reportedly were beaten by the police seeking a confession, and finally released after paying a fine of several thousand pesos.
The Pats explained that since the Cimes had received no compensation for the damage to their fencing they still wanted more revenge, especially against Don Primitive whom they regarded as the main source of their troubles. (Don Eus was reported to have said: "If not for this Primitive who reads and thinks he knows so much, we wouldn't have this trouble-the others don't know what to do.") According to the Pats, the Cimes began shooting one day when they saw Don Primitive standing in his doorway arguing with a brother of Don Bus. The Cimes insisted that the Pats began the shooting and because of their Protestantism even shot into the oratorio (public chapel) in an unsuccessful attempt to destroy the saints kept there. Both sides agreed that shots were exchanged across the plaza between Cime and Pat houses.
One shot passed through Don Primitivo's face, another entered his chest. Severely wounded, he was carried to the highway during the dark predawn hours and an ambulance took him to a Merida hospital, where he recovered. Meanwhile the Pats went to officials in Merida to make an accusation, and police were sent to arrest the Cimes. Don Eus avoided capture, but several of the Cime men were arrested and fined several thousand pesos.
Thus, the poor who had sought ejido land reform found that the two comisarios who attempted to act in their interest were forced out of Chan Kom by actual or threatened violence. Many decided it best to leave and settle elsewhere, as had happened at the time of the Tamay migration? Since these events of 1958 the population of Chan Kom has consisted of the Cimes, led by Don Bus, a few others allied or married to the Cimes, and a number of lesser status who offer no opposition whatsoever.
All informants, except the Cimes, insisted that the Tamay, Pat, and other migrations from Chan Kom never had been caused by religious differences but 9 Because of similar difficulties, Don Ignacio Batun (Don Nas), described in the first study (Redfield and Villa 1934:212 These findings differ from those of Redfield in a way similar to Oscar Lewis's differences with Redfield regarding the interpretation of the social life of Tepoztlan, for which Redfield likewise overemphasized homogeneity, consensus, and harmony in important aspects of social life. In contrast to Redfield's claim that there was general approval when a few of the wealthy took de facto private possession of relatively large sections of the best of Chan Kom's communal ejido land, strong disapproval was found among members of other families, particularly the less wealthy dedicated primarily to the cultivation of corn whose basic means to subsistence was being threatened. However, their opposition was ineffective in preventing the wealthiest from taking this and other measures to increase their differential advantages. As often occurs in a stratified community, the wealthiest were able to mobilize sufficient political power to overcome any serious resistance to their economic and political dominance. This latter situation was made possible especially after Chan Kom became the capital of an independent municipality whose internal government was legally controlled by local people with minimal outside interference. The conflict situation which developed especially after the achievement of municipal status led to considerable migration from Chan Kom by the corn cultivators of conlparatively low status who were placed in an increasingly disadvantageous economic situation as population grew, productivity declined, and the cattle of the wealthy increasingly attacked their corn fields. On several occasions they were joined in migrating by those of higher status who were defeated in attempts to prevent the growing concentration of economic advantages and political power in the hands of the leaders of the largest and wealthiest patrilineal family group. This type of conflict over position in the system of social stratification, in in which a cacique eventually came to power in Chan Kom, is not a rare occurrence in this type of community. Local caciques were so prevalent during the Diaz regime that much of the revolutionary fervor of rural people in the Mex- One reason that social stratification and structural heterogeneity often have been assumed to be practically absent from rural peasant communities as compared to urban commercial and industrial centers is the much greater degree of specialization in economic activity and the diverse occupations usually found in the latter. Since nearly all residents of a rural peasant community may be engaged in agricultural activity, and peasant values tend to discourage the extremes of differential conspicuous consumption and display common among urban people, observers often conclude that whatever differences do occur among rural peasants are not as structurally significant as the social stratification found among urban people. However, it seems to me that the information available about Chan Kom and other peasant communities indicates that the stratification differences among relatively wealthy peasants, those who cultivate barely enough for subsistence, and the completely landless can be quite comparable, and just as important to the people involved, as those occurring among the distinct classes or occupational groupings of the urban center.
Furthermore, the economy of a peasant community like Chan Kom is organized into a series of relatively independent family units of production, each normally capable of satisfying nearly all its consumption needs by its own production. From the viewpoint of the observer, there is less economic need for integration and consensus among such units than among the highly specialized economic segments of the urban industrialized community. The conflict of interest between factory worker and owner-manager emphasized by Marx and others as the classic example of class conflict usually occurs in a framework of greater economic functional integration than that occurring in this type of peasant community. Whatever other differences might divide them, factory workers and owner-managers must perform their economic activities cooperatively within the same production unit: some must work at one kind of task, some at others, and some must plan and direct the work in order for anyone to obtain earnings from the enterprise. This kind of economic cooperation is required within but not among the distinct family economic units in a peasant community like Chan Kom. Thus, in such a community, especally when ecological conditions make for a scarcity of adequate means to subsistence, the occurrence of social stratification among family units easily lends itself to an awareness of conflicting interests and the development of class conflict 
